After searching the area, the police located the defendant hiding in shrubbery. 7 The victim identified the defendant in police custody after she returned from the hospital.' The defendant's sentence included a "certification that defendant was a sex offender pursuant to" '9 the Sex Offender Registration Act' 0 (SORA). The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed his conviction, 1 ' but did not address Hemandez's constitutional claim that his certification pursuant to the SORA was a violation 2 of the Ex Post Facto Clause, 13 so Hemandez appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled that the mandatory SORA certification was part of a defendant's conviction, 4 and was appealable as a mandatory surcharge." 5 7id.
8 People v. Hernandez, 93 N.Y.2d 265, 711 N.E.2d at 973, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 696. 9 Id. at 266, 711 N.E.2d at 974, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 697. 10 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § § 168 to 168-v (McKinney 1996) . Subsection d (1) provides in pertinent part: "Upon conviction the court shall certify that the person is a sex offender and shall include the certification in the order of commitment. The court shall also advise the sex offender of the duties of this article." Id. This law is New York's version of Megan's law, see Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 , 1266 (2d Cir. 1997 The defendant argued on remand to the Appellate Division that his certification as a sex offender by the sentencing court violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws since the SORA was effective after January 21, 1996, almost a year after the the SORA certification is finalized on conviction and recorded when sentenced, it has the same procedural tack. Conviction and sentencing are part of the judgment, and since the surcharge component is appealable, likewise the Court of Appeals held the SORA certification should also be appealable. defendant committed his offense." The Appellate Division found Hernandez's sole contention unpersuasive, noting that many courts upheld application of the SORA to convicted sex offenders whose crime was committed before the effective date of the SORA. 2 " Most of the reasoning that the cited cases relied upon can be found in Doe v. Pataki.22 A two part Ex Post Facto Clause test was enunciated in Pataki. The first determination required examination of the statute to determine whether the legislature intended to impose criminal punishment. If the legislature clearly intended the statute to be punitive, the statute could not be applied retroactively without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. If the legislature intended not to impose criminal punishment, then secondly, the challenger would have to show that the law had an essentially punitive character in purpose or effect, contrary to legislative intent. ' In the preamble of the SORA, "the legislature articulated two goals: (1) protecting members of the community, particularly their children, by notifying them of the presence of individuals in their midst who may present a danger, and (2) enhancing law enforcement authorities' ability to investigate and prosecute future sex crimes. ' Review, Vol. 16 [2015] , No. 2, Art. 29 http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/29 convicted sex offenders by severity of offense, which invoked a higher frequency and duration of registration and three corresponding levels of notification. ' The Pataki court found three reasons why the notification provision of the law was non-punitive despite its inclusion in the Corrections Law volume of the New York Statutes: (1) the scope of notification is related to the risk of recidivism; (2) public access to information is carefully controlled through a pay-per-use 900 telephone number; ' and, (3) there are many safeguards including criminal penalties for misuse of the information. 9 As held by the court in Matter of M. G. v. Travis, "[t] he registration provisions were adopted as a remedial measure to ameliorate the danger to the public caused by the release of sex offenders, to address recidivism and to provide law enforcement with an investigative tool for identifying and acting upon potential recurrence of sexual offenses by past offenders."
The court
Department of Probation... is charged with the responsibility of developing guidelines and procedures to assess the risk of re-offense and the threat posed."
Id (citing N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-1).
26 Id at 1267-68. The notification was made to law enforcement agencies and/or the public based on the potential for recidivism. Id 27 Id at 1278. The risk level of the offender is determined according to the likelihood of recidivism, and a broader disclosure is given to the public for a higher risk level. A risk level one causes notification to be made to the law enforcement agency of the residence of the offender following release, and the law enforcement agency where the offender resided at the time of his conviction. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-1 (6)(A). Risk level two permits the law enforcement agencies to disseminate relevant information to any entity having a vulnerable population related to the nature of the offense. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-1 (6)(B). A risk level three is preserved for a "sexually violent predator," and additionally permits relevant information to be made available to the public.
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-I (6)(C).
' Id The caller must identify the individual by name, exact address, and other required information, and the amount of information released is dependent upon the risk level. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-p. reasoned that registration was necessary in order to implement the notification provisions of the law. 3 The public was not given notice of registration, and the burden imposed by registering was not severe enough to constitute punishment. When compared to other weightier burdens upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court "against ex post facto challenges, including deportation, termination of financial support, and loss of livelihood," 32 registration is not punishment. Sihice Hernandez merely established the temporal relationship of the commission of his crime and did not make a showing that certification was punitive in form and fact, the second part of the Pataki determination did not need to be invoked by the Appellate Division. The legislative intent of the SORA covers all three provisions of the law--certification, registration and notification. Hernandez failed to distinguish the certification provision from the registration and notification provisions of the SORA, and how the certification by the sentencing court of his status as a sex offender could be considered punishment. 33 The Appellate Division deemed the certification required by the SORA non-punitive and constitutional by reference to People v. Langdon. 34 Certification of Hemandez as a sex offender does no more than place a general classification upon him for conviction of the specific crimes with which he was charged. 
